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Introduction 
On June 23, 2021, the United Kingdom Royal Navy destroyer HMS Defender, detached to the 
Black Sea on “its own [unspecified] set of missions” from a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) in the 
Mediterranean, was en route from Odessa, Ukraine, to Batumi, Georgia, when she passed 
approximately nine kilometres off Cape Fiolent on the southwest coast of Crimea. What 
happened next depends on which account one chooses to believe. According to the Russian 
Ministry of Defence, a “[Black Sea Fleet] border guard patrol ship conducted warning fire . . . 
[and] a Su-24M plane carried out preventing [sic] bombing (four OFAB-250 bombs) along 
the route of . . . Defender.”1 In a written statement to the House of Commons the next day, 
the British Secretary of State for Defence specified that,  
a Russian coastguard vessel warned that Russian units would shortly commence 
a live fire gunnery exercise . . . HMS Defender noted gunnery astern and out of 
range of her position. This posed no danger to HMS Defender. During her transit, 
HMS Defender was overflown by Russian combat aircraft at varying heights, the 
lowest of which was approximately 500 feet. These aircraft posed no immediate 
threat to HMS Defender . . . .2 
These competing factual accounts have dominated most of the coverage of the incident, but 
there has been comparatively little reference to the territorial status of Crimea (which has 
been in dispute since 2014), and it is notable that the international law arguments used 
(explicitly or implicitly) differ markedly in doctrinal emphasis, even when one passes over 
the rhetorical grandstanding. This short article evaluates the June 23 incident at the 
intersection of the two bodies of international law that are principally relevant: the 
international law of the sea and the international law of armed conflict. 
 
Innocent Passage 
The immediate point made by the UK was that Defender was exercising the right of innocent 
passage, “as is the right of the United Kingdom (and all nations) under international 
maritime law,”3 while the formal Russian statement averred that Defender’s actions had 
been “a blatant violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS III 1982],”4 
without specifying which particular provisions had been violated. The right of innocent 
passage through foreign territorial waters, long recognised in customary international law,5 
is codified in UNCLOS and had already previously been understood to extend to warships6 as 
a matter of lex lata, although state practice as to its pre-conditions (notably, whether 
warships require prior notification and authorisation) remains far from unanimous.  
 
The Soviet Union conceded more than three decades ago that the right of innocent passage 
extended to warships,7 albeit not at that time in the Black Sea. A Notice to Mariners issued 
earlier in 2021 announced in relation to the Black Sea that, “[i]n the interests of the Russian 
Federation security the innocent passage of foreign warships and other government ships 
has been temporarily suspended through territorial sea of the Russian Federation until 2100 
UTC 31 October 2021”8—a measure explicitly permitted under Article 25(3) of UNCLOS. 
Article 19(1) of UNCLOS specifies that passage is “innocent” only “for so long as it is not 
prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal State”; Article 19(2) then 
defines such prejudice as being constituted by, inter alia, “any act of propaganda aimed at 
affecting the defence or security of the coastal State.” The British explanation of Defender’s 
role in the Black Sea as exemplifying the UK’s commitment to supporting Ukraine’s 
territorial integrity and sovereignty and “securing its security” (sic),9 however, implicitly 
disputes Russia’s standing even to invoke innocent passage in this instance. 
 
Whose Territorial Sea, and Does It Matter? 
In fact, the statement to Parliament explicitly referred to Defender’s “innocent passage 
through Ukrainian territorial waters” and specified that the UK “does not recognise any 
Russian claim to these waters.”10 Crimea, an Autonomous Republic within Ukraine since the 
latter’s 1991 independence from the USSR, purportedly “acceded” to the Russian 
Federation in March 2014 following a controversial referendum on the peninsula’s status 
that had been unilaterally called by its secessionist Supreme Council. The consequent 
annexation, which has left Crimea under de facto Russian control ever since, has only been 
formally recognised by 8 states;11 a UN General Assembly resolution condemning the 
referendum as invalid and calling on all states not to recognise any alteration to Crimea’s 
status was supported by 100 states,12 including the UK. The British argument is thus 
effectively that, Crimea not lawfully being within the jurisdiction of Russia, the latter has no 
territorial sea rights to claim in respect of Crimea under UNCLOS. However, as has been 
suggested elsewhere, this position would appear misguided as it does not assist Ukraine in 
any practical sense and could actually undermine the right of innocent passage if Defender’s 
presence in the area is viewed as a provocation.13 UNCLOS does not, of course, make any 
stipulations as to the validity of title to littoral territory: it merely refers, in Article 2(1), to 
the “sovereignty of a coastal State” and, whilst it might be arguable that this implies that 
the sovereignty must be legitimate under international law, the point has not been 
conclusively determined in doctrine or jurisprudence. Moreover, the essence of innocent 
passage is that it is a right of all states to be exercised freely and without permission in all 
territorial seas: the fact that no permission is required makes the question of title to 
territory immaterial. In any event, as “sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised 
subject to . . . other rules of international law,”14 and there are other rules of international 
law that are relevant as lex specialis in the case of Crimea, the focus of argument shifts from 
maritime law to international humanitarian law (IHL). 
 
Belligerent Occupation and the Territorial Sea 
The circumstances of Russia’s seizure of Crimea mean that since 2014 the peninsula has 
been under belligerent occupation in terms of IHL.15 Although the relevant provisions of The 
Hague Regulations (1907) and Geneva Convention IV focus on occupation of land territory, 
there are clear and cogent arguments for the regime of belligerent occupation to be applied 
equally to maritime areas immediately adjacent to an occupied area of land.16 Russia’s de 
facto control of Crimea as an Occupying Power means that it is entitled to enact provisions 
and take measures for the protection of its own security,17 and the Notice to Mariners 
restricting the right of innocent passage in the Black Sea explicitly claimed it to be necessary 
for security reasons. It is internally inconsistent for the UN on the one hand to demand that 
Russia uphold its obligations as an Occupying Power under IHL, while simultaneously 
denying it the rights that come with that status in relation to maritime activity. Moreover, 
there are modern precedents for an Occupying Power suspending innocent passage in 
territorial waters of occupied territory, as the U.S. did in the vicinity of Iraqi oil terminals in 
the Persian Gulf during the Coalition’s belligerent occupation of Iraq in 2004;18 and from 
1968, Israel declared the occupied Gaza Strip to be a “closed area,” to which access by sea 
(inter alia) was subject to permission for security reasons.19 
 
Conclusion 
As is all too often the case in such situations, there are some elements of right and wrong on 
both sides. Although prima facie the U.K. was certainly entitled to send Defender through 
the waters off Cape Fiolent in exercise of the right of innocent passage under international 
maritime law, Russia was equally within its rights under IHL to promulgate temporary 
restrictions on innocent passage, as long as they were not discriminatory between ships of 
different nationalities (as opposed to different types of ships); the restrictions to navigation 
in the Black Sea were announced more than three weeks before the Carrier Strike Group 
even left Portsmouth Harbour. As has been persuasively argued at greater length 
elsewhere: “During the ongoing armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine the law of the 
sea is at least partly supplanted by the law of armed conflict and, in particular, the law of 
occupation.”20 
 
The existence of the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine—not that the former cares 
to acknowledge it as such, but that does not matter under IHL—and the proximity of 
Defender’s course to the major Russian Black Sea Fleet base at Sevastopol doubtless 
account for the rapidity and ferocity of Russia’s reaction to the alleged “border violation” by 
a foreign naval surface unit. There have been close encounters with NATO warships in the 
Black Sea on many occasions since at least the later stages of the Cold War, and the recent 
incident off Cape Fiolent has been characterised by the Russian side as a pre-planned 
provocation and escalation. Already the rhetoric has been ramped up in Moscow, with an 
implicit threat that force could be used on a self-defence argument.21 In London, Foreign 
Secretary Dominic Raab emphasized that British warships will continue to “exercise and 
defend the rights under UNCLOS . . . from the Ukrainian territorial sea to the South China 
[S]ea.”22 Russia and the U.K. have not even attempted to engage substantively with each 
other’s legal arguments, but have remained in separate sea lanes, metaphorically speaking, 
intersecting only on the point—largely irrelevant, as this piece argues—of territorial 
sovereignty. 
 
Beijing, meanwhile, watched and waited as the CSG drew ever closer to waters that it 
considers its exclusive preserve. China is perhaps the world’s most notable exponent of the 
view that only merchant vessels can benefit from the right of innocent passage.23 Of 
particular note in this context is that the CSG’s ultimate destination was publicly stated to 
be the Indo-Pacific and Japan, via the Strait of Malacca;24 Foreign Secretary Raab even 
hinted more explicitly that one of its destinations was the South China Sea.25 China’s well-
known sensitivity to any perceived challenge to its hegemony has recently been re-
emphasized by the China Coast Guard (CCG) Law of January 22, 2021, which refers to the 
area self-delimited by the “nine-dash line” as “sea areas under the jurisdiction of the 
People’s Republic of China” and stipulates that CCG vessels will take enforcement measures 
up to and including the use of force against foreign warships or government vessels violating 
these waters.26 In line with its previous statements, China would doubtless characterise the 
use of force in such circumstances as an exercise of its right to self-defence.27 Although in 
the event the new British naval presence in the region has passed with nothing more 
dangerous than rhetorical warnings from China, the conditions for an armed confrontation 
in the future are present; and the legal questions raised by the HMS Defender incident will 
have done nothing to lessen the risk. 
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